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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Manuel Garcia Velasco appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd
conduct.

On appeal, he asserts that his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination was violated when the district court referenced at sentencing findings
made during Velasco's competency evaluation, which were also noted in the
psychosexual evaluation for sentencing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Sometime in April, 2007, Velasco sexually abused his step-granddaughter,
touching her vagina with both his hand and his penis. (PSI, p.2.) The state charged
Velasco with lewd conduct.

(#36094 R, pp.16-17.)

Pursuant to defense counsel's

motion, the district court ordered a competency evaluation. (#36094 R, pp.22-25.) The
evaluator found that Velasco was competent to proceed.

(#36094 R, 28.) Velasco

later informed the district court through counsel that, pursuant to plea negotiations, he
intended to plead guilty pursuant to Alford. 1 (#36094 R, p.31.) At the change of plea
hearing, the district court attempted to question Velasco regarding his Alford plea, but
was apparently unsuccessful.

(#36094 R, p.36.)

The district court ordered a

competency evaluation with Dr. Kenneth P. Lindsey. (#36094 R, pp.33-36.)
During the competency evaluation, "Velasco attempted to present himself as
almost completely lacking in knowledge about his case and about the legal process
more generally."

(Competency Evaluation, p.5.)

Dr. Lindsey, while expressing

concerns that Velasco was "exaggerating any neurocognitive difficulties," ultimately

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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found Velasco competent to proceed. (Competency Evaluation, p.7.) At a subsequent
hearing, the district court again attempted to take Velasco's guilty plea, but Velasco
maintained that he was incapable of remembering the crime. (Tr} p.29, L.3 - p.33,
L.15.) The district court tried to take Velasco's plea pursuant to Alford, but ran into
further difficulties while asking Velasco if he agreed that the state could prove its case to
a jury and whether Velasco would benefit from the plea agreement. (Tr., p.35, 1.20 p.40, 1.14.) Ultimately, the district court found a sufficient factual basis for the Alford
plea but reserved ruling on whether it was offered knowingly and intelligently. (Tr., p.48,
L.20 - p.49, 1.9.) After reviewing the relevant authorities, the district court determined
that Velasco's Alford plea was both knowing and voluntary and issued an order
accepting it. (#36094 R., pp.51-57.)
Thereafter, the district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation from Dr. Lindsey
and informed Velasco of his right against self-incrimination regarding that evaluation.
(#36094 R., p.61; Tr., p.55, Ls.15-20.)

In his psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Lindsey

referenced and summarized his prior competency evaluation findings, including that
Velasco was exaggerating his mental difficulties.

(PSE, p.2.)

Velasco continued to

claim that he could not remember any aspects of his crimes throughout the
psychosexual evaluation, until he was confronted with the results of his polygraph exam
which showed his deception. (PSE, pp.3-6.) Velasco then became more forthcoming,
admitting that he remembered all the underlying facts of the crime against his stepgranddaughter, which he had previously denied, and also the sexual molestation of his
step-daughter and instances of bestiality. (Id.)

2

All citations to "Tr." refer to the Reporter's Transcript on Appeal from Docket #36094.
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The district court referenced both of Dr. Lindsey's reports during sentencing.
(See Tr., p.64, L.22 - p.66, L.3.) The district court entered judgment against Velasco
and imposed a unified sentence of 30 years with 10 years fixed. (#36094 R, pp.68-69.)
Velasco timely appealed from the original judgment. (#36094 R, pp.71-73.) However,
Velasco's appellate counsel failed to file an appellate brief, and Velasco's appeal was
dismissed.
granted.

(See R, pp.8, 10-11.) Velasco sought post-conviction relief, which was

(R, pp.9-14.)

The district court reentered the judgment of conviction (R,

pp.16-17), and Velasco timely appeals (R, pp.20-22).

3

ISSUE
Velasco states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court violate Mr. Velasco's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when it improperly used information
obtained for purposes of determining Mr. Velasco's competency at
sentencing?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Velasco failed to establish that the district court's reference at sentencing to
findings made during Velasco's competency evaluation, which were also noted in the
psychosexual evaluation for sentencing, constitutes fundamental error entitling him to
relief?
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ARGUMENT
Velasco Has Failed To Establish That The District Court's Reference At Sentencing To
Findings Reported In The Competency Evaluation, Which Were Also Reported In The
Psychosexual Evaluation, Constitutes Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Relief
A.

Introduction
Throughout the proceedings, Velasco claimed that he was unable to remember
(See,~,

that he molested his step-granddaughter.

Tr., p.30, L.3 - p.33, L.15; p.36,

Ls. 2-10.) After the polygraph portion of his psychosexual evaluation, his deception was
uncovered and Velasco finally acknowledged his crime. (PSE, pp.3-6.) While arguing
for probation at sentencing, defense counsel said:
I think most significant also is that he through the-during the
process of the psychosexual evaluation, Mr. Velasco came to disclose the
truth about this offense. He's admitted what he's, what he's done and I
think through that process has come ready to, to face the, the sexual
problems that he has and could-would be successful on treatment or in
treatment.
I know it's-it certainly reflects poorly on Mr. Velasco that he didn't
admit it before the, the psychosexual evaluation; but I also understand that
this would certainly be a, a hard matter to admit. And I think some
process would have to be gone through before you could get to the point
where you could really freely admit that you had done this.
(Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.64, L.10.)
The district court disagreed with defense counsel's assessment as to why
Velasco was suddenly able to remember the circumstances of his crime. The district
court pressed defense counsel on whether probation was really appropriate,
[e]specially where it appears that Dr. Lindsey, to some degree,
really pegged his neurocognitive function at the beginning where he
figured that he was-what was the term he used? Let's see if I can find it
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here. I want to say manipulating; but I don't think that was the actual term
he used.
MR. MURDOCH: Are you, are you thinking of the prior competency
evaluation?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MURDOCH: I think that's on Page 2 of the psychosexual.
THE COURT: Oh, malingering was the term he used, right?
MR. MURDOCH: I don't recall him using that term here in the
psychosexual; but I, I believe heTHE COURT: That was the term he used initially, and that's why
we jumped through all these hoops with him.
And now, as I read the psychosexual evaluation-and I, I don't
know what led to it other than perhaps the pressure of the deception being
found on the polygraph-that he finally said, yeah, I remember all this.
And at the same time, the Court had some concern that how do you
remember the child being in the bed with you, that you remember moving
the child over when you got home, but can't remember any of the criminal
conduct; and then we get to this point where he's finally admitted.
So I guess that's the question is how, how do we justify saying, this
type of behavior, a person ought to be placed on probation.
Velasco asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the district court violated his
Fifth Amendment rights by referencing the conclusion from the competency evaluation
that Velasco had been malingering, even though that conclusion was also reported in
the psychosexual evaluation.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-S.)

Review of the record and

applicable legal standards shows that Velasco has failed to establish either a clear
constitutional violation in the district court's reference, or that he was prejudiced
thereby. Velasco has therefore failed to establish fundamental error.

6

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

Absent a timely objection, the

appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental
error doctrine. Statev. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

C.

The District Court's Reference To The Competency Evaluation Neither Clearly
Violates Velasco's Right Against Self-Incrimination Nor Prejudices Him
In order to establish that he is entitled to relief on his claim, Velasco must satisfy

the standard articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry. Under Perry, to establish
fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.

kl at 226,245 P.3d at 978.

Velasco has failed to meet this appellate burden.

The state acknowledges that improper reliance on conclusions derived from a
competency evaluation at sentencing would satisfy the first prong of Perry.

See,~,

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820, 229
P.3d 1179, 1183 (Ct. App. 2010).

However, under the specific circumstances of this

case, Velasco cannot satisfy the second and third prongs of the Perry standard.
Therefore, he has failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to relief.
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const.
amend. V. However, when a defendant volunteers an uncoerced statement after being
informed of his right to remain silent, he waives that right. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560
U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). Velasco was informed of his right against selfincrimination before participating in the psychosexual evaluation. (Tr., p.55, Ls.15-20.)
Velasco voluntarily participated in the psychosexual evaluation. (See generally PSE.)
Thus, Velasco waived his right against self-incrimination as regards the psychosexual
evaluation and all of its findings.
Dr.

Lindsey, the licensed psychiatrist who performed the psychosexual

evaluation, also performed the competency evaluation.

(Compare PSE with

Competency Evaluation.) In the psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Lindsey referenced and
summarized his "prior competency evaluation findings."

(PSE, p.2.)

Dr. Lindsey

reported that "findings [from the competency evaluation] indicated that Mr. Velasco was
exaggerating any neurocognitive difficulties that might actually be present."

(ld.)

Furthermore, regarding Velasco's psychosocial history, Dr. Lindsey specifically referred
the reader to the competency evaluation "for specifics." (ld.)
Because Velasco waived his right against self-incrimination by voluntarily
partiCipating in the psychosexual evaluation, and because the psychosexual evaluation
referenced and summarized the "prior competency evaluation findings," the record does
not clearly establish that the district court relied on any information outside of Velasco's
Fifth Amendment waiver. It is therefore unclear that the district court violated Velasco's

8

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by referencing the finding from the
competency evaluation.
Equally unclear is whether defense counsel's failure to object was a tactical
decision. The district court's finding that Velasco had been deceptive throughout the
proceedings was inevitable. Throughout the proceedings, at which the district judge
was present, Velasco had maintained that he was incapable of remembering his crimes.
(See,

~,

Tr., p.30, L.3 - p.33, L.15; p.36, Ls. 2-10.) Throughout the course of the

psychosexual evaluation, Velasco continued to deny that he could remember any
aspects of his criminal conduct, until he was confronted with the results of his polygraph
exam which showed that he was lying. (See PSE, pp.3-6.) Then Velasco was suddenly
able to remember all the details of his crimes, not only against his step-granddaughter,
but also the sexual abuse of his step-daughter and instances of bestiality. (ld.) The fact
that Velasco had attempted to deceive the court throughout the proceedings stands
independent of the term Dr. Lindsey used when he correctly identified Velasco's
neurocognitive function as malingering in the competency evaluation. Objecting to the
district court's reference to that term would have served no purpose.
Furthermore, defense counsel may have been reluctant to assert any objection
that might have resulted in striking the psychosexual evaluation. Although Dr. Lindsey
concluded that "Mr. Velasco was exaggerating any neurocognitive difficulties that might
actually be present" and uncovered Velasco's deception, Dr. Lindsey's psychosexual
report was favorable to Velasco.
treatment in the community.

In fact, Dr. Lindsey recommended probation with

(PSE, p.?) Also, because Dr. Lindsey concluded that

Velasco posed only a moderate risk to reoffend, and did not find that Velasco was a
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predator or a pedophile (see PSE, pp.6-8), the prosecutor was also required to
recommend probation.

(#36094 R., p.46; see also Tr., p.67, L.25 - p.68, L.16.)

Because the psychosexual evaluation summarized the competency evaluation's
conclusions, asserting Velasco's Fifth Amendment right to not have those conclusions
considered at sentencing may have resulted in the loss of this favorable psychosexual
evaluation. Under such circumstances, defense counsel may have made the tactical
decision to not object in order to maintain the favorable recommendations.
For the same reasons that the district court's referencing the competency
evaluation's conclusion that Velasco exaggerated his neurocognitive difficulties does
not present a clear violation of Velasco's right against self-incrimination, it is also not
prejudicial. That Velasco exaggerated his mental difficulties was not only a finding of
the competency evaluation, but was a finding of Dr. Lindsey's psychosexual evaluation
as well. (PSE, p.2.) The district court is supposed to consider the findings reported in
the psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing.

I.C. § 18-8316.

Velasco is not

prejudiced by the district court referencing competency evaluation findings, which also
appear as findings in the psychosexual evaluation.
Moreover, a primary concern of the district court during sentencing was
Velasco's deception throughout the proceedings. (See Tr., p.64, L.18 - p.66, L.3; p.76,
L.24 - p.77, L.13.) Velasco's deception, though guessed at during the competency
evaluation, was not established by that evaluation; rather, it was shown during the
psychosexual evaluation's polygraph examination.

(See PSE, pp.3-6.)

Velasco's

economy with the truth was an appropriate factor for the district court to consider at
sentencing, especially as it related to Velasco's ability to be rehabilitated and to be
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treated in the community. See State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, _ , 275 P.3d 12,21 (Ct.
App. 2012) ("failure to acknowledge guilt may indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential");
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 1998) (district
court properly considered defendant's dishonesty during PSI). Rather than call Velasco
an outright liar, however, the district court referenced the more polite term used in the
prior competency evaluation: "malingering." (Tr., p.64, L.22 - p.65, L.15.) "Malingering"
is defined by the American Psychiatric Association as "the intentional production of false
or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external
incentives." DSM-IV-TR, p.739 (APA, 2000). Pulling from the competency evaluation
the term used to describe Velasco's ongoing deception, which had only been
conclusively shown during the psychosexual evaluation, certainly did not prejudice
Velasco.
Velasco has failed to establish that referencing the term used in the competency
evaluation to describe the fact that he was exaggerating his mental health problems and
feigning that he could not remember his crime constitutes a clear violation of his right
against self-incrimination, especially where those findings were related in the
psychosexual evaluation as well.

Because the psychosexual evaluation, despite

reporting those findings, was overall favorable to Velasco, defense counsel's failure to
object to that reference may have also been tactical. Moreover, Velasco's deception
was established during the psychosexual evaluation's polygraph examination, not the
competency evaluation.

Finally, where Velasco's continued deception was apparent

from legitimately considered evidence, Velasco has failed to show that he was
prejudiced by the district court's reference to the term employed in the competency
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evaluation to describe that ongoing deception.

Having failed to establish a clear

constitutional violation and prejudice, Velasco has failed to establish fundamental error
entitling him to relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Velasco's conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2012.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of August, 2012, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

CR~

Deputy Attorney General

RJS/pm
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